United Nations, since only under those circumstances would American control
be assured. Ideally, the Marshall Plan would provide an economic arm to the
political strategy embodied —in the Truman Doctrine. Moreover, if presented
as a program in which even Eastern European countries could participate, it
would provide, at last potentially, a means of including pro-Soviet countries
and breaking Stalin's political and economic domination over Eastern Europe.
On that basis, Marshall dramatically announced his proposal at Harvard
University's commencement on June 5, 1947. "Our policy is directed not
against any country or doctrine," Marshall said, "but against hunger,
poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be revival of a working
economy. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery
will find full cooperation ... on the part of the United States government."
Responding, French Foreign Minister George Bidault invited officials
throughout Europe, including the Soviet Union, to attend a conference in
Paris to draw up a plan of action. Poland and Czechoslovakia expressed
interest, and Molotov himself came to Paris with eighty-nine aides.
Rather than inaugurate a new era of cooperation, however, the next few days
simply reaffirmed how far polarization had already extended. Molotov urged
that each country present its own needs independently to the United States.
Western European countries, on the other hand, insisted that all the
countries cooperate in a joint proposal for American consideration. Since the
entire concept presumed extensive sharing of economic data on each country's
resources and liabilities, as well as Western control over how the aid would
be expended, the Soviets angrily walked out of the deliberations. In fact,
the United States never believed that the Russians would participate in the
project, knowing that it was a violation of every Soviet precept to open
their economic records to examination and control by capitalist outsiders.
Furthermore, U.S. strategy was premised on a major rebuilding of German
industry—something profoundly threatening to the Russians. Ideally, Americans
viewed a thriving Germany as the foundation for revitalizing the economies of
all Western European countries, and providing the key to prosperity on both
sides of the Atlantic. To a remarkable extent, that was precisely the result
of the Marshall Plan. Understandably, such a prospect frightened the Soviets,
but the consequence was to further the split between East and West, and in
particular, to undercut the possibility of promoting further cooperation with
countries like Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
In the weeks and months after the Russians left Paris, the final pieces of
the Cold War were set in place. Shortly after the Soviet departure from Paris
the Russians announced the creation of a series of bilateral trade agreements
called the "Molotov Plan," designed to link Eastern bloc countries and
provide a Soviet answer to the Marshall Plan. Within the same week the
Russians created a new Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), including
representatives from the major Western European communist parties, to serve
as a vehicle for imposing Stalinist control on anyone who might consider
deviating from the party line. Speaking at the Cominform meeting in August,
Andre Zhdanov issued the Soviet Union's rebuttal to the Truman Doctrine. The
United States, he charged, was organizing the countries of the Near East,
Western Europe, and South America into an alliance committed to the
destruction of communism. Now, he said, the "new democracies" of Eastern
Europe—plus their allies in developing countries—must form a counter bloc.
The world would thus be made up of "two camps," each ideologically,
politically, and, to a growing extent, militarily defined by its opposition
to the other.
To assure that no one misunderstood, Russia moved quickly to impose a steel-
like grip on Eastern Europe. In August 1947 the Soviets purged all left-wing,
anticommunist leaders from Hungary and then rigged elections to assure a pro-
Soviet regime there. Six months later, in February 1948, Stalin moved on
Czechoslovakia as well, insisting on the abolition of independent parties and
sending Soviet troops to the Czech border to back up Soviet demands for an
all new communist government. After Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk either
jumped or was pushed from a window in Prague, the last vestige of resistance
faded. "We are [now] faced with exactly the same situation . . . Britain and
France faced in 1938-39 with Hitler," Truman wrote. The Czech coup coincided
with overwhelming approval of the Marshall Plan by the American Congress. Two
weeks later, on March 5, General Lucius Clay sent his telegram from Germany
warning of imminent war with Russia. Shortly thereafter, Truman called on
Congress to implement Universal Military Training for all Americans. (The
plan was never put in place.) By the end of the month Russia had instituted a
year-long blockade of all supplies to Berlin in protest against the West's
decision to unify her occupation zones in Germany and institute currency
reform. Before the end of spring, the Brussels Pact had brought together the
major powers of Western Europe in a mutual defense pact that a year later
would provide the basis for NATO. If the Truman Doctrine, in Bernard Baruch's
words, had been "a declaration of ideological or religious war," the Marshall
Plan, the Molotov Plan, and subsequent developments in Eastern Europe
represented the economic, political, and military demarcations that would
define the terrain on which the war would be fought. The Cold War had begun.
Chapter 3: The Role of Cold War in American History and Diplomacy.
3.1 Declaration of the Cold War.
In late February 1947, a British official journeyed to the State Department
to inform Dean Acheson that the crushing burden of Britain's economic crisis
prevented her from any longer accepting responsibility for the economic and
military stability of Greece and Turkey. The message, Secretary of State
George Marshall noted, "was tantamount to British abdication from the Middle
East, with obvious implications as to their successor." Conceivably, America
could have responded quietly, continuing the steady stream of financial
support already going into the area. Despite aid to the insurgents from
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the war going on in Greece was primarily a civil
struggle, with the British side viewed by many as reactionary in its
politics. But instead, Truman administration officials seized the moment as
the occasion for a dramatic new commitment to fight communism. In their view,
Greece and Turkey could well hold the key to the future of Europe itself.
Hence they decided to ask Congress for $400 million in military and economic
aid. In the process, the administration publicly defined postwar diplomacy,
for the first time, as a universal conflict between the forces of good and
the forces of evil.
Truman portrayed the issue as he did, at least in part, because his aides had
failed to convince Congressmen about the merits of the case on grounds of
self-interest alone. Americans were concerned about the Middle East for many
reasons—preservation of political stability, guarantee of access to mineral
resources, a need to assure a prosperous market for American goods. Early
drafts of speeches on the issue had focused specifically on economic
questions. America could not afford, one advisor noted, to allow Greece and
similar areas to "spiral downward into economic anarchy." But such arguments,
another advisor noted, "made the whole thing sound like an investment
prospectus." Indeed, when Secretary of State Marshall used such arguments of
self-interest with Congressmen, his words fell on deaf ears, particularly
given the commitment of Republicans to cut government spending to the bone.
It was at that moment. Dean Acheson recalled, that "in desperation I
whispered to [Marshall] a request to speak. This was my crisis. For a week I
had nurtured it."
When Acheson took the floor, he transformed the atmosphere in the room. The
issue, he declared, was the effort by Russian communism to seize dominance over
three continents, and encircle and capture Western Europe. "Like apples in a
barrel infected by the corruption of one rotten one, the corruption of Greece
would infect Iran and alter the Middle East . . . Africa . . . Italy and
France." The struggle was ultimate, Acheson concluded. "Not since Rome and
Carthage has there been such a polarization of power on this earth. . . . We
and we alone are in a position to break up" the Soviet quest for world
domination. Suddenly, the Congressmen sat up and took notice. That
argument, Senator Arthur Vandenberg told the president, would be successful. If
Truman wanted his program of aid to be approved, he would—like Acheson—have to
"scare hell" out of the American people.
By the time Truman came before Congress on March 12, the issue was no longer
whether the United States should extend economic aid to Greece and Turkey on
a basis of self-interest, but rather whether America was willing to sanction
the spread of tyrannical communism everywhere in the world. Facing the same
dilemma Roosevelt had confronted during the 1930S in his effort to get
Americans ready for war, Truman sensed that only if the issues were posed as
directly related to the nation's fundamental moral concern—not just self-
interest— would there be a possibility of winning political support. Hence,
as Truman defined the question, the world had to choose "between alternative
ways of life." One option was "free," based on "representative government,
free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, and freedom of speech and
religion." The other option was "tyranny," based on "terror and oppression, a
controlled press and radio, . . . and a suppression of personal freedoms."
Given a choice between freedom and totalitarianism, Truman concluded, "it
must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities."
Drawing on the "worst case" scenario implicit in Kennan's telegram, Truman,
in effect, had presented the issue of American-Soviet relations as one of
pure ideological and moral conflict. There were some who criticized him.
Senator Robert Taft, for example, wondered whether, if the United States took
responsibility for Greece and Turkey, Americans could object to the Russians
continuing their domination over Eastern Europe. Secretary of State Marshall
was disturbed at "the extent to which the anticommunist element of the speech
was stressed." And George Kennan, concerned over how his views had been used,
protested against the president's strident tone. But Truman and Acheson had
understood the importance of defining the issue on grounds of patriotism and
moral principle. If the heart of the question was the universal struggle of
freedom against tryanny—not taking sides in a civil war— who could object to
what the government proposed? It was, Senator Arthur Vandenberg noted,
"almost like a presidential request for a declaration of war. . . . There is
precious little we can do except say yes." By mid-May, Truman's aid package
had passed Congress overwhelmingly.
On the same day the Truman Doctrine received final approval, George Marshall
and his aides at the State Department were busy shaping what Truman would
call the second half of the same walnut— the Marshall Plan of massive
economic support to rebuild Western Europe. Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium—all were devastated by the war, their cities lying in rubble, their
industrial base gutted. It was difficult to know if they could survive, yet
the lessons of World War I suggested that political democracy and stability
depended on the presence of a healthy and thriving economic order. Already
American officials were concerned that Italy—and perhaps France—would
succumb to the political appeal of native communists and become victims of
what William Bullitt had called the "red amoeba" spreading all across Europe.
Furthermore, America's selfish economic interests demanded strong trading
partners in Western Europe. "No nation in modern times," Assistant Secretary
of State Will Clayton had said, "can long expect to enjoy a rising standard
of living without increased foreign trade." America imported from Europe only
half of what it exported, and Western Europe was quickly running out of
dollars to pay for American goods. If some form of massive support to
reconstruct Europe's economy were not developed, economic decay there would
spread, unemployment in America would increase, and political instability
could well lead to communist takeovers of hitherto "friendly" counties.
3.2 Cold War Issues.
Although historians have debated for years the cause of the Cold War,
virtually everyone agrees that it developed around five major issues:
Poland, the structure of governments in other Eastern European countries, the
future of Germany, economic reconstruction of Europe, and international
policies toward the atomic bomb and atomic energy. All of these intersected,
so that within a few months, it became almost impossible to separate one from
the other as they interacted to shape the emergence of a bipolar world. Each
issue in its own way also reflected the underlying confusion and conflict
surrounding the competing doctrines of "universalist" versus "sphere-of-
influence" diplomacy. Examination of these fundamental questions is
essential if we are to comprehend how and why the tragedy of the Cold War
evolved during the three years after Germany's defeat.
Poland constituted the most intractable and profound dilemma facing Soviet-U.S.
relations. As Secretary of State Edward Stettinius observed in 1945, Poland was
"the big apple in the barrel." Unfortunately, it also symbolized, for both
sides, everything that the war had been fought for. From a Soviet perspective,
Poland represented the quintessence of Russia's national security needs. On
three occasions, Poland had served as the avenue for devastating invasions of
Russian territory. It was imperative, given Russian history, that Poland be
governed by a regime supportive of the Soviet Union. But Poland also
represented, both in fact and in symbol, everything for which the Western
Allies had fought. Britain and France had declared war on Germany in September
1939 when Hitler invaded Poland, thus honoring their mutual defense pact with
that victimized country. It seemed unthinkable that one could wage war for six
years and end up with another totalitarian country in control of Poland. Surely
if the Atlantic Charter signified anything, it required defending the right of
the Polish people to determine their own destiny. The presence of 7 million
Polish-American voters offered a constant, if unnecessary, reminder that such
issues of self-determination could not be dismissed lightly. Thus, the first
issue confronting the Allies in building a postwar world would also be one on
which compromise was virtually impossible, at least without incredible
diplomatic delicacy, political subtlety, and profound appreciation, by each
ally, of the other's needs and priorities.
Roosevelt appears to have understood the tortuous path he would have to
travel in order to find a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Given his own
commitment to the Atlantic Charter, rooted in both domestic political reasons
and personal conviction, he recognized the need to advocate an independent
and democratic government for the Polish people. "Poland must be
reconstituted a great nation," he told the country during the 1944 election.
Yet the president also repeatedly acknowledged that the Russians must have a
"friendly" government in Warsaw. Somehow, Roosevelt hoped to find a way to
subordinate these two conflicting positions to the higher priority of postwar
peace. "The President," Harry Hopkins said in 1943, "did not intend to go to
the Peace Conference and bargain with Poland or the other small states; as
far as Poland is concerned, the important thing [was] to set it up in a way
that [would] help maintain the peace of the world."
The issue was first joined at the Tehran conference. There, Churchill and
Roosevelt endorsed Stalin's position that Poland's eastern border, for
security reasons, should be moved to the west. As Roosevelt had earlier
explained to the ambassador from the Polish government-in-exile in London, it
was folly to expect the United States and Britain "to declare war on Joe
Stalin over a boundary dispute." On the other hand, Roosevelt urged Stalin to
be flexible, citing his own need for the Polish vote in the 1944 presidential
election and the importance of establishing cooperation between the London
Poles and the Lublin government-in-exile situated in Moscow. Roosevelt had
been willing to make a major concession to Russia's security needs by
accepting the Soviet definition of Poland's new boundaries. But he also
expected some consideration of his own political dilemma and of the
principles of the Atlantic Charter.
Such consideration appeared to be forthcoming in the summer of 1944 when
Stalin agreed to meet the prime minister of the London-Polish government and
"to mediate" between the two opposing governments-in-exile. But hopes for
such a compromise were quickly crushed as Soviet troops failed to aid the
Warsaw Polish resistance when it rose in massive rebellion against German
occupation forces in hopes of linking up with advancing Soviet forces. The
Warsaw Poles generally supported the London government-in-exile. As Red Army
troops moved to just six miles outside of Warsaw, the Warsaw Poles rose en
masse against their Nazi oppressors. Yet when they did so, the Soviets
callously rejected all pleas for help. For eight weeks they even refused to
permit American planes to land on Soviet soil after airlifting supplies to
the beleaguered Warsaw rebels. By the time the rebellion ended, 250,000
